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Nowadays, Social Media are a privileged channel for news spreading, information exchange,
and fact checking. Unexpectedly for many users, automated accounts, known as social bots,
contribute more and more to this process of information diffusion. Using Twitter as a
benchmark, we consider the traffic exchanged, over one month of observation, on the
migration flux from Northern Africa to Italy. We measure the significant traffic of tweets only,
by implementing an entropy-based null model that discounts the activity of users and the
virality of tweets. Results show that social bots play a central role in the exchange of sig-
nificant content. Indeed, not only the strongest hubs have a number of bots among their
followers higher than expected, but furthermore a group of them, that can be assigned to the
same political tendency, share a common set of bots as followers. The retweeting activity of
such automated accounts amplifies the hubs’ messages.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s42005-020-0340-4 OPEN
1 IMT Scuola Alti Studi Lucca, Piazza S. Francesco 19, 55100 Lucca, Italy. 2 European Centre for Living Technology, Università di Venezia Ca’ Foscari, S. Marco
2940, 30124 Venice, Italy. 3 Catchy srl, Talent Garden Poste Italiane Via Giuseppe Andreoli 9, 00195 Rome, Italy. 4 Istituto dei Sistemi Complessi CNR, Dip.
Fisica, Università Sapienza, P.le Aldo Moro 2, 00185 Roma, Italy. 5 CINI—Cybersecurity National Laboratory, Rome, Italy. 6 Istituto di Informatica e
Telematica, CNR, Pisa, Italy. ✉email: marinella.petrocchi@iit.cnr.it









G lobal Digital Report, in 2018, said that ‘more than 3 billionpeople around the world now use social media eachmonth’ (https://digitalreport.wearesocial.com). Even tra-
ditional newspapers and news agencies moved to social networks,
to cope with this societal change.
Since a decade microblogging platforms, like Twitter, have
become prominent sources of information1, catching breaking
news and anticipating more traditional media like radio and tel-
evision2. Helped by the simple activity consisting of creating a text
of 140 (now 280) characters, on Twitter we assist to the pro-
liferation of social accounts governed—completely or in part—by
pieces of software that automatically create, share, and like con-
tents on the platform. Such software, also known as social bots—
or simply bots—can be programmed to automatically post
information about news of any kind and even to provide help
during emergencies. As amplifiers of messages, bots can simply be
considered as a mere technological instrument. Unfortunately, the
online ecosystem is constantly threatened by malicious automated
accounts, recently deemed responsible for tampering with online
discussions about major political elections in western countries,
including the 2016 US presidential elections, and the UK Brexit
referendum3–6. Worryingly, propensity to fall into disinformation
has been recently measured in US by Ruths in ref. 7 and recent
work by Shao et al. demonstrates that automated accounts are
particularly efficient in spreading low credibility content and
amplifying their visibility8. Also, Stella et al. show how such
accounts target influential people, bombarding them with hateful
contents9 and influencing the public opinion during noteworthy
events10, while Grinberg et al. observe how they even interact with
genuine users according to their political affiliations11. In 2017, a
study by the Indiana University12 highlighted that, on average,
social bots account for 9% to 15% of total active Twitter users.
This notable percentage maintains over time since bots evolve: in a
large-scale experiment, Cresci at al. in ref. 13 proved that neither
Twitter admins, nor tech-savvy social media users, nor cutting-
edge applications were able to tell apart evolving bots and
legitimate users.
Academicians make their best efforts to fight the never ending
plague of malicious bots populating social networks. The litera-
ture offers a plethora of successful approaches, based, e.g., on
profile-14,15, network-16–18 and posting-characteristics19–21 of the
accounts. In particular, the supervised approach proposed by
Cresci et al. in ref. 14 tested a series of classification rules proposed
by bloggers, and features sets by Academia, on a reference dataset
of genuine and fake accounts, leading to the implementation of a
classifier, which significantly reduces the cost for data gathering.
Actually, the studies regarding detection of automated accounts
rarely analyse their effective contribution in the social networks
panorama. Indeed, while messages exchanged on social platforms
contain a great amount of data, just a fraction of them carries
crucial information for the description of the system, while the
rest contributes to random noise. Thus, detecting the relevant
(i.e., those not compatible with users’ random activity) commu-
nication and interaction patterns is of utmost importance in order
to understand which accounts, including bots, contribute to the
effective dissemination of messages. In this sense, it is necessary
to compare the properties of the real network with a proper
null model.
Entropy-based null-models are a natural choice, since they are
general and, being based on Shannon entropy, unbiased by
construction. In a nutshell, starting from the real network, their
definition relies on three steps: (1) the definition of an ensemble
of graphs; (2) the definition of the entropy for this ensemble and
its maximization up to some (local or global) constraints22; (3)
the maximization of the likelihood of the real network23,24.
Entropy-based null-models have been successfully used in the last
years for the analysis of complex networks25,26. The fields of
application are the most varied, from reconstructing a network
from partial information27, to detecting early signals of structural
changes28,29, to assessing the systemic risk of a financial
system30,31. Recently, this approach has been applied by Becatti
et al.32 to the Twitter traffic during the 2018 Italian election
campaign. The study was able to infer political standings directly
from data. Moreover, the analysis of the exchanged messages
showed a signal of communication between opposite political
forces during the election campaign, which anticipated an
unexpected post-elections political agreement.
In the present paper, we merge the application of the
lightweight classifier for bot detection proposed by Cresci et al.
in ref. 14 with the analysis of complex networks via entropy-
based null-models. Once we have cleaned the system from the
random noise via the application of the null-model, we study
the effects of social bots in retweeting a significant amount of
messages on Twitter. The analysis is applied to a tweet corpus
about migration in the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa
to Italy.
This study has two main results: firstly, after cleaning the
system from the random activity of users, we detect the main
hubs of the network, i.e., the most effective accounts in sig-
nificantly propagating their messages. We observe that those
accounts have a number of bots among their followers (in the
cleaned network) higher than average. Secondly, the strongest
hubs in the network share a relatively high number of bots as
followers, which most probably aim at further increasing the
visibility of the hubs’ messages via following and retweeting.
Hereafter, we will refer to groups of bots that follow and retweet
the same group of hubs with the term bot squads. To the best of
our knowledge, the existence of formations of bots shared by a
group of human-operated accounts has never been reported in
the literature before.
Results
User polarization. On Twitter, users are strongly clustered in
communities sharing similar ideas (evidences of this, and dis-
cussions of its implications, can be found in many papers, see,
e.g., refs. 33–41). Our assumption is that, if two users interact with
the same followers and followees, they probably share similar
viewpoints, including those regarding politics. We thus build
clusters of politically homogeneous groups by starting from those
accounts for which we have the greatest information available.
We exploit the fact that Twitter offers the possibility (upon
request of the account owner) to obtain an official certification of
account’s authenticity. The procedure is mostly adopted by VIPs,
official political parties, newspapers, radios and TV channels, to
reduce interferences of fake users. Accounts that pass the pro-
cedure are tagged as verified and on the official portal have a blue
circle, with a white tick at the center, close to their name. Verified
users have been proved to be a solid starting point for accurate
analyses. In fact, not only they lead to valuable information about
the number of bots that follow them (see work by Varol et al. in
ref. 42), but also, following the communication patterns of a set of
verified accounts, it is possible to get a very large set of trusted,
i.e., not bots, accounts43.
To infer the political orientation of a user from the available
data, we focus on the bipartite network of verified (on one layer)
and unverified (on the other layer) accounts, as in Fig. 1. A link
between two users belonging to the different sets is present if one
of them retweeted at least once the other user. In our
representation, the network is undirected: we do not consider
who retweeted who, but only the mere presence of at least one
retweet.
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It is worth noting that other types of interactions, such as
replies, mentions and quoted tweets are present on Twitter. We
are considering retweeting activity only, since it represents the
preferred way through which users spread messages they agree
with34. If we had used, for instance, replies, the network would
have been much harder to interpret; replies can be used either to
support the ideas of the original tweet, or to express disagreement
towards them. A similar reasoning holds for the other possible
interactions. By inserting mentions in a tweet, a user either invites
the mentioned accounts to participate to the discussion, or points
out that the tweet somehow affects them; however, it can be either
in provocative or in constructive ways. Analogously, in the case of
quoted tweets, the sender may intend to comment a tweet, but it
might be either to support or to deplore it. Thus, since the
intention of the mentions, quotes and replies can be of different
kinds, we focus on retweetting, the type of interaction which is
not amenable to multiple interpretations.
We project the bipartite network of verified and unverified
users on the layer of the former. To do that, we consider the
statistically significant amounts of interactions shared by pairs of
verified accounts. The steps of such projection are sketched in
Fig. 1. For every couple of verified users, we count the number of
common unverified ones interacting with them and compare this
number with its expected probability distribution according to an
entropy-based null-model constraining the degree sequence of
both layers of the bipartite network. If the p-value of the
observation on the real network is statistically significant, we
project a link on the layer of verified users. In this way, we can
focus on that statistical significant group of verified users that is
similarly perceived by the unverified users. The technical details
about this validated projection can be found in the “Methods”
section.
The presence of a strong community structure in the bipartite
network composed of verified and unverified layers of users has
already been observed by Adamic at al. in ref. 33. Here, we repeat
the analysis of Becatti et al.32 and check the results on the layer of
verified users, for which we have reliable information. Also in this
case we find a strong community structure.
We would like to remark that we assign the terms ‘validated’
and ‘verified’ two different meanings: the former indicates a node
that passes the filter of the projection while the latter refers to
accounts that pass an authenticity check by Twitter.
There are other approaches to inferring the political orienta-
tion of users from data. Del Vicario et al.37, for instance, consider
several groups of Facebook pages and divide users depending on
the frequency they interact with each group of pages. Instead, to
decide whether a user is a Democrat or a Republican, Conover
et al. in refs. 34–36 use network properties of retweets and a
machine learning algorithm to determine the topic of a tweet.
However, in both approaches, the communities are somehow
decided a priori, either by data selection or by defining the
groups. On the contrary, with our method, communities naturally
arise from data.
Political orientation: in the following, we will often refer to
Italian parties and representatives of the Italian government
in office during the period in which the data were collected
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the projection procedure for bipartite undirected networks. a an example of a real bipartite network. For the actual
application, the two layers represent verified (turquoise) and unverified (grey) users and a link between nodes of different layers is present if one of the two
users retweeted the other one, at least one time. b the Bipartite Configuration Model (BiCM) ensemble is defined. The ensemble includes all possible link
realisations, once the number of nodes per layers has been fixed. c we focus our attention on nodes i and j, i.e., two verified users, and count the number of
common neighbours (in magenta both the nodes and the links to their common neighbours). Subsequently, (d) we compare this measure on the real
network with the one on the ensemble: If this overlap is statistically significant with respect to the BiCM, (e) we have a link connecting the two verified
users in the projected network.
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(23 January– 22 February 2019). For the sake of clarity,
Supplementary Note 1 briefly explains the high-level character-
istics of such parties.
The bipartite network describing the retweets between verified
and unverified users involves nearly one half of the unverified
users in our dataset. Nevertheless, the network obtained by
following the projection procedure described in the “Methods”
section shows a strong community structure, see Fig. 2.
To quantify the presence of clusters, we use the Louvain
algorithm44, one of the most effective community detection
algorithms. To avoid problems related to node ordering45, on a
network with N nodes, we apply the algorithm for N times, after
reshuffling the order of nodes. Among the N partitions resulting
by the application of the algorithm, we then select the
configuration with the largest modularity45. Such configuration,
reported in Fig. 2, displays three main communities: one tied to
the current government (right-wing parties and Movimento 5
Stelle, the Mediterranean blue community), one tied to the Italian
Democratic Party (PD), its representatives, and some representa-
tives of smaller parties on the left of PD (the tomato red
community), and one tied to several NGOs, politicians on the left
of PD, and different online and offline news-papers (eggplant
purple community). Smaller communities, including one with
Joseph Muscat, Malta’s Prime Minister, and part of his ministers,
have been involved in the discussion for the aid of migrants and
castaways. The composition of the communities in Fig. 2 is
detailed in the Supplementary Note 1.
If we compare the emerged communities with those observed
by Becatti et al.32 during the 2018 electoral campaign, we notice
several differences. The outcome of32 was that the Movimento
5 stelle (hereafter M5S) group and their supporters were clearly
distinguishable from the right wings, while, on issues concerned
with the Mediterranean migration, they are not. Instead, on the
same issues, the left wing representatives, inside and outside the
Democratic Party, are much closer than during the electoral
campaign.
Polarization of unverified accounts: verified accounts of
politicians can be easily associated to a political party; then
membership of unverified users can be guessed by considering
their interactions with the communities of verified ones. To do








where ki is the degree of node i, k
c
i is the number of links towards
the community c and C is the set of communities. The
Fig. 2 The network resulting from the projection procedure. The network presents a strong community structure. The accounts tied to the Italian
government (Lega and Movimento 5 Stelle) and other right wing parties are in Mediterranean blue. The accounts of the center-left wing parties (e.g., the
Italian Democratic Party, PD) are in tomato red. The eggplant purple group includes media official accounts, several NGOs and left-wing politicians. Some
official accounts related to the Catholic Church are in orange. In turquoise we represent some smaller groups involved in the debate, such as the Maltese
Prime Minister Joseph Muscat and some of his ministers, and in basil green we represent a soccer commentators community.
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distribution of ρi is extremely peaked on values close to 1, see
Fig. 3a. Given such a strong polarization, we can safely assign
unverified users the polarization of the community they mostly
interact with.
We also find a small amount (with respect to the size of
verified–unverified network) of unverified nodes whose polariza-
tion is not strong enough to be uniquely assigned to a specific
cluster: they are part of the grey group in Fig. 3b.
As noted at the beginning of the previous paragraph, this
polarization procedure does not consider almost one half of the
unverified users, since they do not interact, on the whole
observation period, with a single verified user. This may be due to
several reasons. Differently from Becatti et al.32, where a corpus of
tweets exchanged during the election campaign was analyzed,
here we focus on a set of tweets concerned with a specific topic of
the political propaganda. We conjecture that, in the former case,
the amount of unverified accounts interacting with the verified
ones was much higher because it was of interest of the verified
accounts (mostly, candidates in the elections) to involve
‘standard’ users.
In order to know more about unverified users not directly
interacting with verified ones, we use what we call a contagion of
polarization, namely a label propagation procedure in which the
labels are those assigned in the previous steps. Even if unverified
users do not retweet verified users, they may retweet other
unverified ones and reveal their political orientation through
those. As seeds for the propagation of the label, we use the tags
obtained in the previous step, i.e., the polarization of verified and
unverified users of the previously defined bipartite network. If the
majority of the unverified accounts retweeted by the account we
want to tag is polarized towards a certain group, we assign that
account to the same group. The procedure is iterated and
terminates as soon as it is not possible to assign a polarization to
any unverified user. We thus assign to unverified users the
prevailing polarization of the accounts they interact with and stop
when there is no possibility to assign a polarization anymore, i.e.,
if there is no clear agreement among the neighbours of the
considered node. In this way, after 10 rounds of such a procedure,
we are able to increase the fraction of the users for which we
determine a clear polarization by 27%. Even if this percentage
looks small, we will see that the label propagation process is
effective for the set of validated unverified accounts considered in
the following sections. In this case, the increase of polarized users
is almost 58%; additional details are reported in the Supplemen-
tary Note 4.
Supplementary Figure 1 illustrates the density of all users (left
panel) and bots (right panel) in the three biggest communities,
after the polarization by contagion procedure. Interestingly
enough, assigning a polarization to bots turns out to be much
harder than for genuine users. If we neglect the contribution of
the grey bars, we can notice that the relative fractions of the
different communities are more or less similar, but for a slight
increase of the abundance of ‘eggplant purple’ bots.
The backbone of the content exchange on Twitter. In the
analysis of a complex system, one of the main issues is to skim
relevant information from noise. Of course, the definition of noise
itself depends on the system. In the previous section, we obtained
the political affiliation of verified users by projecting the infor-
mation in the bipartite network describing the interactions
between verified and unverified users. Now, we will apply the
entropy-based null model, in its directed variant—Bipartite
Directed Configuration Model (BiDCM)—proposed by van Lidth
de Jeude et al.48, to filter the total exchange of content in our
dataset, after discounting the information regarding the activity of
users and the virality of messages, as in ref. 32. We sketch the
procedure in Fig. 4.
We start by considering the directed bipartite network of users
(on one layer) and tweets (on the other layer): an arrow from user
u to tweet t indicates that u wrote t. Analogously, the arrow from
t to u represents u retweeting t. Thus, the bipartite directed
network is intended to describe the retweeting activity of users,
considering the information about the virality of the messages.
We then construct the BiDCM. In the present case, the
constraints describe the node activities, i.e., the number of
original tweets posted by every user, the number of retweets of
every message and the number of retweets of every account. As
for the case of accounts’ polarization, we project the information
contained in the directed bipartite network on one of the two
layers, in order to obtain a monopartite directed network of
accounts. The resulting network represents the significant flow of
information among users. More in details, for each (ordered) pair
of users ðu; u0Þ we consider the number of tweets written by u that
are retweeted by u0. Subsequently, we assess the statistical
significance of this retweeting activity by comparing the real
value in the network under investigation with the theoretical
distributions of the BiDCM. Otherwise stated, if the number of
tweets written by u and retweeted by u0 is greater than expected
and it is not compatible with the theoretical distribution, a link
from u to u0 is projected. Thus, by comparing the real system with
the null model, we can highlight all the contributions that cannot
be explained only by the fixed constraints. Technical details can
be found in the “Methods” section and in the Supplementary
Notes 5 and 6.
Summing up, the filtering procedure returns a directed
network in which the arrows go from the authors to the
Fig. 3 Interactions between verified and unverified users and polarization index distribution among unverified users. a polarization index distribution
among unverified users. The plot is in log-log scale, i.e., nodes with a polarization higher than 0.9 are more than 10 times the one of those with polarization
between 0.8 and 0.9. b biadjacency matrix, describing the interactions between verified and unverified users. Nodes have been rearranged in order to
highlight the community structure and colored according to their communities, i.e. eggplant purple for NGO's, media accounts and left wing politicians,
tomato red for the Democratic Party community, orange for Catholic Church related accounts and Mediterranean blue for the pro-government users. In
gray, users with lower values of polarization or not projected by the validated projection (see “Methods” and Supplementary Notes 2 and 3).
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retweeters and it reduces the number of nodes to 14,883 users and
of links to 34,302. The connectance, i.e. the density of links, of the
network is ρ≃ 3 × 10−5. This network is hereafter referred as
directed validated network, or simply, validated network. Figure 5
shows the structure of the validated network in terms of
communities.
On top of this, we have analyzed the presence of automated
accounts, by using the bot detection method described in the
“Methods” Section. The incidence of bots in the validated
network is about 2.5%, against almost the 7% of nodes in the
original network. The number of loops, i.e., users that retweet
(significantly with respect to their activity) their own tweets, is
around 1.2% of the total amount of links of the validated network,
thus relatively high. This effect reverberates also on the number of
validated nodes, that significantly retweet themselves (slightly
<3%). For the subsequent analyses, we discard the contribution of
loops, since we are interested in analysing the source of the shared
contents on Twitter.
Hubs and bots: as mentioned in the previous section, the
validated links go from the authors to the retweeters. The
effectiveness of an author can be derived by its ability to reach a
high number of relevant nodes: this principle is finely
implemented in the Hubs-Authorities algorithm, originally
introduced by Kleinberg in ref. 49 to rate web pages. In the
original version, the paradigm assigns two scores for each web
page: its authority, which estimates the value of the content of the
page, and its hub value, which estimates the value of its links to
other pages. In the scenario currently under investigation, hubs
and authorities are Twitter accounts. The authorities are sort of
sink of the content exchange. In the following, we will focus on
hubs, because they represent the driving force of the discussion
and are relatively popular users, and even if they are not verified
by Twitter, we often have reliable information about their
accounts.
Table 1 shows the values for the top 20 nodes, in term of hub
scores. The first account is the one of Mr. Matteo Salvini. The
second and the third ones refer to two journalists of a news
website supported by Casa Pound, a neo-fascist Italian party. The
fourth is the account of Ms. Giorgia Meloni, former ally, during
the 2018 Italian electoral campaign, of Lega, the party of Mr.
Salvini. We remind the reader that Mr. Salvini and Ms. Meloni
are the leaders of the two major conservative Italian parties. Their
account names have not been anonymed in Table 1 since they are
verified accounts. The two leaders have similar opinions on how
to deal with the Mediterranean migration. The fifth and sixth
accounts are, respectively, a journalist of ‘Il Fatto Quotidiano’ (a
newspaper close to M5S) and an unverified user with opinions in
line with the ones of the two above mentioned politicians.
Notably, all the accounts in Table 1 belong to the blue
community. The first account with a different membership
(‘TgLa7’, a popular newscast by a private TV channel, whose
account belongs to the purple community) ranks 176th in the hub
score ranking.
The case of the Italian chapter of a NGO assisting migrants in
the Mediterranean Sea is worthy of note: while it has the fifth
highest value of out-degree (kout= 1104), it has an extra low hub
score (4 × 10−4), ranking 452nd. This is impressive since, in
several occasions, the Italian government (in the figure of Salvini,
Fig. 4 Schematic representation of the projection procedure for bipartite directed network. a an example of a real directed bipartite network. For the
actual application, the two layers represent Twitter accounts (turquoise) and posts (grey). A link from a turquoise node to a gray one represents that the
post has been written by the user; a link in the opposite direction represents a retweet by the considered account. b the Bipartite Directed Configuration
Model (BiDCM) ensemble is defined. The ensemble includes all the link realisations, once the number of nodes per layer has been fixed. c we focus our
attention on nodes i and j and count the number of directed common neighbours (in magenta both the nodes and the links to their common neighbours),
i.e., the number of posts written by i and retweeted by j. Subsequently, d we compare this measure on the real network with the one on the ensemble: if this
overlap is statistically significant with respect to the BiDCM, (e) we have a link from i to j in the projected network.
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the Minister of Internal Affair) and the NGO have been
opponents on the issue of disembarking the migrants rescued
during the NGO activities.
Remarkably, we observe a non zero overlap among the bots
in the list of the validated followers of human-operated users.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such a
phenomenon is detected. In our opinion, the use of bot squads,
retweeting the messages of two or more strong hubs, aims at
increasing the visibility of their tweets. We have detected two
main groups of such accounts, the other being composed by a
maximum of two common bots. The first one includes 22
genuine accounts (9 of which are in the top 10 hubs), sharing 22
bots. In this set, some users share a relatively high fraction of
bots; there is one right wing account that shares all its
automated followers with both Meloni and Salvini, see Fig. 6. In
Figs. 7 and 8, we represent two subgraphs of the validated
network in Fig. 5. The subgraph in Fig. 7 shows the first group
of genuine accounts sharing bots and all their bot followers.
Such accounts belong almost exclusively to the blue commu-
nity. The hub scores, represented as the dimensions of the
nodes, are nearly homogeneous among the hubs. This does not
happen in the subgraph referring to the second group (see
Fig. 8): beside the presence of a strong hub, the hub score
distribution is much skewer than for the previous group.
Moreover, in absolute terms, the hub scores are much smaller
than in the previous case, since the strongest hub is the
aforementioned account of ‘TgLa7’ newscast. The accounts in
the subgraph of Fig. 8 belong almost exclusively to the purple
community.
Figure 9a shows that the main activity of the bots in the first
bot squad is retweeting. As expected, they mostly retweets
human-operated accounts connected to them (Fig. 9b). The same
cannot be said for mentions that may be used either to provoke or
to involve the target. Accounts from different political side are
mentioned by bot squads; in fact, the bot accounts with more
than 30 mentions point to members of the blue community as
well as the official account of the Democratic Party (‘pdnetwork’).
It is worth noting that other ‘not-sided’ verified accounts, as the
one of the President of the Republic (‘Quirinale’) and the one of
the President of the Chamber of the Deputies (‘Roberto_Fico’) are
mentioned there and that, in most cases, the messages containing
those mentions are sort of invites, for the institutional figures, to
manage immigrants and migration (Fig. 9c).
The most striking outcome of our content analysis, however,
concerns the sources cited by the bots in the blue squads: 89% of
their original tweets (i.e, not replies, nor retweets or quoted
tweets), contains a URL and 97% of those URLs refers to www.
voxnews.info, a website blacklisted as a source of political
disinformation by two popular fact checking websites, namely
www.butac.it and www.bufale.net. Additional details about our
study on the bots’ squads can be found in the Supplementary
Note 7.
Fig. 5 The directed validated projection of the retweet activity network. Nodes are eggplant purple for NGO’s, media accounts and left wing politicians,
tomato red for the Democratic Party community and Mediterranean blue for the pro-government users; other colours identify smaller communities. An
arrow between a source node and a target node is present if the target is a significant retweeter of the source. The dimension of each node is proportional
to its hub score: the biggest node (in blue) is the account of Matteo Salvini, i.e. the leader of a major wing party and the Minister of Internal Affairs at the
time of the data collection.
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Discussion
The 2018 Eurobarometer report on news consumption presents a
clear increasing trend of popularity of online sources with respect
to traditional ones50. Albeit this widespread favour, online media
are not trusted as their offline counterparts: in a survey conducted
in autumn 2017, 59% of respondents said they trusted radio
content, while only 20% said they trusted information available
on online social networks. Even beside the perception of common
users, the presence of fake content has indeed been revealed in
several research work, both at level of news per se, as done by,
e.g., Quattrociocchi et al. in ref. 39 and Shao et al. in ref. 8, and of
fake accounts contributing to spreading them (see, for example,
the overview on the rise of social bots by Ferrara et al.51).
Twitter is one of the most studied social media, due to the
openness of its data through the available public APIs. Also, it is
strongly used by professionals for news distribution: a 2017 sur-
vey by AGCOM, the Italian guaranteeing agency for commu-
nications52, showed that Italian journalists appear on Twitter
much more frequently than common users. Therefore, Twitter
has been used for many analyses of communication in the poli-
tical propaganda, see, e.g., refs. 4,8–10,32,38,53–60. Obviously, a
major issue when performing such kind of analyses is the relia-
bility of the results, which is closely connected to the reliability of
the users in the game: in such sense, a rich stream of research is
devoted to finding means for detecting automated accounts—
even anticipating their future evolution, as done by Cresci et al.
via genetic algorithms in ref. 61 —and their interactions with
human-operated accounts9,10,62.
Remarkably, all the previous analyses rarely tackle the effect of
random noise, which is indeed of utmost importance when
studying complex systems. In63, Jaynes showed how Statistical
Physics could be derived from Information Theory from an
entropy maximization principle. Following Jaynes work, in recent
years the same approach has been extended to complex net-
works22–26, to provide an unbiased benchmark for the analysis,
by filtering out random noise. Such a framework proved to be
extremely ductile and adaptable to the analysis of different phe-
nomena, in trade networks24,28,29,64–66, financial networks27,30,31
or online social networks32,67. In the present study, we jointly use
a bot detection techniques and an entropy-based null-model for
the analysis of the content exchange on Twitter in the Italian
discussions on migrant flows from Northern Africa. The analysed
corpus has been extremely useful for highlighting the mechan-
isms used for disseminating information in political debates.
To get the political affiliation of users, we focused on the
bipartite network in which the two layers represent verified and
unverified users, respectively, and the (undirected) links label the
correspond to the retweetting interactions between the two clas-
ses. The main idea is to infer the inclination of users towards a
political point of view from (a proxy of) their contacts: users
which share a big number of followers and followees probably
have similar opinions. The bipartite network is then projected on
the layer of verified users using an entropy-based null-model, by
following the procedure introduced in Saracco et al. in ref. 29.
Verified users have been clustered into three main groups, see
Fig. 2: one group includes Italian government representatives, the
right wing and the Movimento 5 Stelle party; a second group
includes the Italian Democratic party; a third one includes NGOs,
online and offline media, journalists and some VIPs (like actors,
singers, movie directors). Confirming results presented in other
studies38,39,68,69, the polarization of unverified users is particu-
larly strong: they interact quite exclusively with accounts of a
single community, see Fig. 3.
Starting from verified users, using a label propagation algo-
rithm we iteratively assign a group membership to unverified
users, by considering the political inclination of the majority of all
their followers and followees. This procedure reduces the number
of unpolarized accounts of more than 35%. Oddly, the ratio of bot
accounts that remain unpolarized after the ‘political contagion’ is
higher than the analogous for all users, see Supplementary Fig. 1.
However, we have seen that users, be they human-operated or
bots, who take part in a significant and effective way in the dis-
cussion, are mostly polarized.
Finally, we extract the non trivial content exchange by adopting
the validated projection developed by Becatti et al in ref. 32 in
order to detect the significant flow of messages among users,
while discounting the virality of messages, the retweeting activity
of users and their productivity in writing tweets.
The network represented in Fig. 5 is extremely informative for
different reasons. The validated network contains only 14,883
validated users out of the 127,275 users in the dataset. This
highlights the fact that just a minority of all users effectively
contributes to the online propaganda on the migration flow.
Interestingly, the incidence of bots on the validated network is
almost one third of the analogous measure on the entire dataset,
signaling that the number of bots whose retweets are non com-
patible with a random activity is a minority. Since one of the
targets of a social bot is to increase audience of the online content
of a specific (group of) user(s), such a reduction shows that, in
our scenario, the number of bots affecting significantly the poli-
tical discussion is limited.
The accounts in the validated network are much more polar-
ized than the whole set of users in the original network, see
Fig. 10. In fact, in the original network, the overall fraction of
unpolarized accounts represents more than 40% of all the
accounts and more than 50% of all the automated ones. Instead,
when considering the validated network, the same ratio is around
10% for the former and around 5% for the latter. Otherwise
Table 1 Screen names of the hubs in the validated network,
their hub score, their out-degree kout, the fraction of bots in
their out-neighbours (indicated as jboti j
kouti
and the ratio
between this value and the average over the entire network
(indicated as jboti j
kouti
= jbotjNvalidatedusers). For the sake of privacy, the
screen names of the unverified accounts have been
anonymized. Matteo Salvini and Giorgia Meloni, the leaders
of the two major right wing parties, have not being
anonymised, since they are verified accounts.








‘matteosalvinimi’ 1.000 3473 0.023 1.058
‘hub_1’ 0.490 1270 0.003 0.141
‘hub_2’ 0.465 1199 0.004 0.187
‘GiorgiaMeloni’ 0.427 1303 0.032 1.444
‘hub_4’ 0.395 1040 0.005 0.215
‘hub_5’ 0.326 809 0.011 0.498
‘hub_6’ 0.300 775 0.009 0.404
‘hub_7’ 0.290 574 0.002 0.078
‘hub_8’ 0.282 583 0.0 0.0
‘hub_9’ 0.271 646 0.003 0.139
‘hub_10’ 0.200 395 0.005 0.227
‘hub_11’ 0.189 368 0.0 0.0
‘hub_12’ 0.186 401 0.005 0.224
‘hub_13’ 0.166 341 0.009 0.394
‘hub_14’ 0.152 268 0.0 0.0
‘hub_15’ 0.133 245 0.012 0.549
‘hub_16’ 0.128 222 0.0 0.0
‘hub_17’ 0.126 299 0.013 0.600
‘hub_18’ 0.112 190 0.0 0.0
‘hub_19’ 0.106 279 0.011 0.482
ARTICLE COMMUNICATIONS PHYSICS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s42005-020-0340-4
8 COMMUNICATIONS PHYSICS |            (2020) 3:81 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s42005-020-0340-4 | www.nature.com/commsphys
stated, the polarized bots pass the validation process more easily
than their unpolarized counterparts and their contribution in
spreading messages is more significant.
All the accounts that are mostly effective in delivering their
messages (i.e., the Hubs, by following the paradigm defined by
Kleinberg in ref. 49) refer to the blue area in Fig. 5, where we can
find representatives of the Italian government in charge at the
time of data collection, and the right wing. The first account
referring to a community different from the blue one is the
official account of the newscast ‘TgLa7’, at position 176th in the
hub ranking.
Regarding the contribution of bots to the visibility of the
various accounts, the fraction of bots that significantly retweet
the content of two right wing political leaders (Mr. Salvini and
Ms. Meloni) is greater than the incidence of bots in the whole
validated network. Interestingly enough, other hubs show a
smaller presence of bots among their followers, even if
their hub score is not that different from the two political
leaders.
Finally, we found that some hubs do share their bots: Fig. 6
describes the normalized overlap between the list of bots of each
pair of users in the list of the top 20 hubs. As mentioned before,
those accounts are from the right wing political area. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that such a behaviour is
reported: in analyses tackling the same problem, i.e., the inter-
actions among human-operated accounts and bots9,10,12, only
star-like sub-graphs were observed, with a big number of bots
among the followers of a (presumably) human-operated user. We
have found bunches of bots attached to bunches of hubs, and
although we cannot make any claim about the mind and the
strategy behind this organization, we find the result noteworthy,
and consider interesting to look for the phenomenon in other
datasets.
We underline that the considered shared bots are particularly
effective, since they are validated by the entropy-based projection.
Actually, the group of right wing bots, each supporting more than
a human-operated account, is not the only one in the set, but it is
the greatest: if we consider the subgraphs of human-operated
accounts sharing their bots, see Figs. 7 and 8, the former has 172
nodes against 58 of the latter. Moreover the first subgraph is by
far more efficient; indeed, in the second one the greatest hub
score ranks 176th.
It is well known that bots aim at increasing popularity of users
by retweeting their messages (see, e.g., work by Cresci et al.13, that
reveals how bots, e.g., retweet in a coordinated fashion celebrities’
accounts). The projection procedures followed in this paper
reveal such a coordinated activity in a pretty robust way. In fact,
we argue that the emergence of statistically significant commu-
nication patterns could hardly be hidden by an attacker, because
the latter would have to employ more automated accounts to
‘hide’ their activities within the expectations of the probability
distribution obtained by the BiDCM.
Fig. 6 The relative overlap matrix among list of bots following the top 20 hubs. The generic matrix entry represents
jboti\botj j
jboti j , i.e. the percentage of shared
bots between users i and j over the number of bots following node i. There are 12 accounts sharing a relatively high number of bots.
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To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first investigation
that merges bot detection and entropy-based analysis of Twitter
traffic. Moreover, the obtained results are in line with the previous
work by Shao et al.8, where the authors showed how bots massively
support the spread of (low credibility) content. At the same time,
the present investigation contributes in a different way, being not
specifically focused on fake news, whereas8 concentrates on the way
fake news become viral. Interestingly enough, among the many
studies about the 2016 US presidential election, Grinberg et al.11
analyzed the proliferation of fake news on Twitter and determined
both fake news spreaders and exposed users. The role of bots in
effectively conveying a message—for the first time here highlighted
even in a ‘shared fashion’—and the spreading of fake news in online
discussions of great importance, e.g., about elections and news
reports, see refs. 8,11 calls for future studies, which include a deeper
analysis of the exchanged messages.
Methods
Data collection and processing. Our study is based on a large corpus of Twitter
data, generated by collecting tweets about migrations, and focusing on the case of
migrant flows from Northern Africa to Italy. For data collection, we developed a
crawler based on the Twitter public Filter API, which provides real-time tweet
delivery, filtered according to specified keywords. We selected a set of keywords
compatible with recent chronicles. Table 2 lists the selected keywords. The filtering
procedure was not case-sensitive. The keywords have been selected because they
are commonly used in Italy when talking and writing about immigration flows
from Northern Africa to the Italian coasts, including the dispute about the holder
of jurisdiction for handling emergencies, involving European countries and NGOs
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_immigration_to_Europe).
We collected 1,082,029 tweets, posted by 127,275 unique account IDs, over a
period of one month (from 23 January 2019 to 22 February 2019). By relying on
the bot detection classifier developed by Cresci et al. in14 and recapped in the
following section, all the accounts have been classified either as human-operated or
as bots. This classification led to 117,879 genuine accounts and 9,396 social bots.
All the collected tweets were stored in Elasticsearch (https://www.elastic.co) for fast
and efficient retrieval.
It may be worth noting that the period over which the data have been
collected was characterized by a lively political debate in Italy about the landing
of one ship operated by NGOs rescuing migrants fleeing from North Africa to
Italy. On 16 August 2018, the Italian coastguard boat ‘Diciotti’ rescued almost
200 migrants off Lampedusa island and initially received a veto to land from the
Italian government; it was allowed to do so only after 10 days. Mr. Matteo
Salvini, at that time Minister of Internal Affairs, was afterwards investigated for
kidnapping and abuse of office; the case was stopped on 19 February 2019, when
the Italian Senate did not grant judges the possibility to prosecute him. Right
before and after the Senate’s decision there was an intense debate on social
networks about migrants and NGOs, and about the role of Italian Government
and of the European Union.
Fig. 7 Subgraph of the largest group of users sharing bots. The subgraph includes genuine accounts (in dark blue) and all the bots following them (in
magenta). The dimension of the nodes is proportional to their hub score, but normalised on the subgraph. The biggest node represents the account of Mr.
Salvini. In the picture, there are 22 bots shared by 22 humans. Among the latter, 9 accounts are among the top 10 hubs. The subgraph contains 172 nodes.
Notably, the accounts belong almost exclusively to the blue, i.e., pro-government, community.
Table 2 Keywords used for collecting tweets about migrant





Scafisti Boat drivers as human smugglers
Seawatch A NGO operating in the Mediterranean Sea
Barconi Barges/boats
Clandestini Illegal immigrants
Guardia costiera libica Lybian coast guard
Naufragio Shipwreck
Sbarco disembarkation
Keywords have been searched in Italian, the English correspondents are at their right.
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Bot detection classifier. To assess the nature of the accounts in the dataset about
migration from Northern Africa, we rely on a slightly modified version of the
supervised classification model proposed in ref. 14.
The bot detector uses all the features of an account profile, and has been
developed after testing known detection methodologies on a baseline dataset of
fake and genuine accounts. The former were bought from three online markets,
while the latter were certified as genuine by tech-savvy social media analysts. The
authors tested Twitter accounts in the reference set against algorithms based on: (i)
single classification rules proposed by Media and bloggers, and (ii) feature sets
proposed in the literature for detecting spammers. The results of such preliminary
analysis suggested that fake accounts detection needs specialized mechanisms. They
classified rules and features according to the cost required for gathering the data
needed to compute them and showed how the best performing features are also the
most costly ones. Then, building on the cost of crawling analysis, they implemented
a series of lightweight classifiers using less costly features, while still being able to
correctly classify more than 95% of the accounts of the baseline dataset. They also
validated performances of the classifiers over two other sets of human and fake
accounts, disjoint from the original training dataset.
For the present paper, we reconstruct the model of the classifier of Cresci et al.14
and test its performances with J48, the Weka (https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/
weka/) implementation of C4.5 algorithm, on the same training set, publicly
available at http://mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/dataset.html, obtaining the same
classification performance results. The used features are listed in Table 3.
As a final note, it seems fair to underline how the war against automated,
malicious accounts is constantly in progress. In fact, social bot developers
have become so smart that their creations are very similar to genuine accounts.
An interesting line of research is that of ‘adversarial social bot detection’,
where, instead of taking countermeasures only after having collected evidence of
new bot mischief, detection techniques are proactive and able to anticipate
attacks and next generations of bots. The first seeds for this research were put
by Yang et al. back in 2011–13 who provided the first evidence of social bot
evolutions70. While the first wave of social bots, populating OSNs until
around 2011, were rather simplistic, the second wave featured characteristics
that were quite advanced for the time. Differently from the previous ones,
the social bots studied by Yang et al. were used to purchase or exchange
followers between each other, in order to look more popular and credible. Bot
evolution thus leads us to 2016, when Ferrara et al. documented a third
generation of social bots71. Needless to say, Yang’s classifier was no longer
successful at detecting this third wave of social bots, as experimentally
demonstrated in ref. 13 by Cresci et al.
After Yang et al.’s first adversarial work, many years passed before further
studies were carried out. Indeed, only recently Cresci et al.61 and Grimme et al.72
proposed new adversarial studies in social bot detection. The continuous research
around the theme of social bot detection leads to more and more accurate
techniques, with increasingly reduced errors in classification.
Fig. 8 Subgraph of the second largest group of users sharing bots. The subgraph includes human-operated accounts (in violet) and all the bots following
them (in magenta). The dimensions of the nodes are proportional to the hub scores, but normalised on the subgraph. The impact on the validated network
of the nodes in this subgraph is much more limited: the largest hub is the official account of ‘TgLa7’, a newscast ranking 176th in the hub scores.
Considering even the non shared bots, the subgraph contains 58 nodes. Notably, accounts belong almost exclusively to the purple community.
Table 3 Features adopted for the fake account detector








Following rate (approximated as friendsage )
The account’s profile has a name
The account’s profile has an image
The account’s profile has an address
The account’s profile has a biography
The account’s profile has a URL
The account belongs to a list
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Validated projection of the bipartite network and users polarization. Because
of the official certification released by Twitter about the authenticity of an account,
users can be divided into two sets, the verified and unverified ones. Becatti et al., in
ref. 32, used this feature to infer the accounts’ inclination towards a specific political
area, directly from data. This has been possible by implementing the method of
Saracco et al. proposed in ref. 66. The underlying idea is that unverified users follow
and interact with verified users sharing their political ideals. In this sense, if two
verified users have a high number of common followers and followees, they
probably have a similar political affiliation. The a posteriori analysis of the results
of the validated projection confirms the previous hypothesis. Due to the Twitter
verification procedure, only the information provided by verified users is fact-
checkable, thus our check is restricted to this class of users.
We have to pay attention to the contribution of remarkably active users. For
example, if a verified user is extremely engaged in the political propaganda, such
user may interact with a huge number of unverified ones and may thus share a
great amount of contacts with almost all the other verified users, even those with an
opposite political inclination. In this case, the contribution should be considered
spurious, being just due to the popularity of the user. Analogously, the role of an
unverified user that retweets all messages from her/his contacts should be
discounted.
We obtain the political affiliation of the accounts by considering the undirected
bipartite network of interactions (i.e., retweets) between verified and unverified
users, aggregated over the whole period: we disregard the information about the
direction of the retweets, since we are just interested in groups of users sharing
content. The previous intuition leads us to compare the overlap of connections
(literally, the number of common followers and followees) in the real network with
the expectations of a null-model able to account for the degree sequence of both
layers. In this way, we are able to discount the random noise due to the activity of
users and get the statistically significant information from the data. The entropy-
based BiCM, ref. 66 provides the correct benchmark for this analysis. While we
describe more extensively the theoretical construction in the Supplementary
Notes 2 and 3, here we outline the main intuitions behind the Bipartite
Configuration Model and its monopartite validated projection.
The Bipartite Configuration Model: let us start from a real bipartite network and
call the two layers L and Γ and their dimension respectively NL and NΓ; we label the
nodes on those layers respectively with Latin and Greek indices. We represent the
connection via the biadjacency matrix, i.e., the rectangular (NL × NΓ)-matrix M
whose generic entry miα is 1 if there is a link connecting node i ∈ L and node α ∈ Γ,
and 0 otherwise. We then consider the ensemble GBi of all possible graphs with the
same number of nodes on the two layers as those in the real network. If we assign a





constraining the average value of some quantities of interest on the entire
ensemble. If, as it is the case of the present article, we impose the ensemble to have
fixed average for the number of links per node (i.e., the degree), the probability per





where piα is the probability of finding a link between i and α and xi and yα (the
fitnesses, as defined by Caldarelli et al. in ref. 73) are quantities that encode the
attitude of the nodes to form links22. At this level, the previous definition is formal,
since we just imposed to fix the average (over the ensemble) of the degree sequence,
but we did not decide its value. It can be shown (see Supplementary Notes 2 and 3)
that maximizing the likelihood of the real network is equivalent to fixing the
average of the degree sequence to the one measured on the real network (proofs by
Garlaschelli and Squartini, see refs. 23,24).
Monopartite validated projection: we can now highlight all those contributions
that cannot be related to the degree sequence only, comparing the real network
with the expectations of the BiCM. Following this line, Saracco et al.66 proposed a
validated projection on top of the BiCM. The main idea is to consider the common
links of two nodes on the same layer and compare it with the theoretical
distribution of the BiCM: if the real system shows a commonality of links that
cannot be explained only by the activity of the users, then we project a link between
the two nodes under analysis. Using the formalism of Saracco et al.65, we call V-
motif the overlap.
In formulas, by using the independence of probabilities per graph (2), the
probability that both node i and j link the same node α is simply
pðVijαÞ ¼ piαpjα;
where Vijα is the above mentioned V-motif among i, j and α. The total overlap
between i and j is simply Vij ¼ PαVijα and, according to the BiCM, is distributed as
a Poisson-binomial, i.e., the extension of a binomial distribution in which all the
events have a different probability (see Hong74). We can further associate p-values
to the observed V-motifs, i.e., the probabilities of finding a number of V-motifs
greater than or equal to the one measured on the real network. In order to state the
statistical significance of several p-values at the same time, we relied on a multiple
test hypothesis. The false discovery rate (FDR) is generally considered the most
effective one since it permits to control the number of false negatives, without being
too conservative (see Benjamini and Hockberg75). The result of the projection is a
binary undirected monopartite network of nodes from the same layer, that are
linked if their similarity cannot be explained only by their degree. We therefore
apply the Louvain community detection algorithm (by Blondel et al.44). Since this
method is known to be order dependent, as shown by Fortunato45, we apply it
several times after reshuffling the node order and take the maximum value of the
modularity, i.e. the algorithm objective function.
The interested reader can find in the Supplementary Note 8 an alternative
approach to assign a political inclination to users and a comparison with the
approach followed in this paper (see also Supplementary Fig. 2).
Extraction of the backbone of tweeting activity. As done when evaluating the
statistical significance of the common links of two nodes on the same layer, also
when studying content exchange, we are interested in the flow of information
that cannot be explained by users’ activity only. Differently from other
studies4,9,10,53, we take into account the virality of tweets. Methodologically, the
Fig. 9 Statistics of the largest bot squad. a The main activity of the bot
squad is retweeting. b The target of the retweets of the bot squads are the
strongest hubs of the validated directed network. c The situation is different
for the mentions in the bots’ original tweets: bots in this group mention the
accounts of the right wing (Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni and some other
strong hubs of the validated network), accounts of the left wings (as the
official account of the Democratic Party) and the official account of some
super-partes institutional figures.
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approach is similar to the one adopted for the extraction of the users political
affiliation. The difference consists in (1) substituting the BiCM with its analo-
gous directed version, the BiDCM (proposed by van Lidth de Jeude et al.48) and
in (2) considering layers of different kind. While in the previous section layers
represent verified and unverified users, here they represent tweets on one layer
and users (both verified and unverified) on the other. The validated projection
procedure returns a directed monopartite network of significant exchange of
messages, in which the arrow goes from the message author to the retweeters. As
mentioned in the Results section, the connectance of the network is ρ ≃ 3 × 10−5.
The effective FDR-threshold for p-values is FDRth ≃ 3.0 × 10−7 for α= 0.01; the
analogous Bonferroni effective threshold is much stricter, Bonferronith ≃ 8.8 ×
10−12. Additional details about the BiDCM procedure can be found in the
Supplementary Notes 5 and 6.
Data availability
The datasets analyzed in this study are available under the limits of Twitter’s Developer
Terms at toffee.imtlucca.it.
Code availability
The authors are currently working on releasing the bot detector model and a Python
package implementing the noise filtering in the bipartite directed network. When
available, they will be published at toffee.imtlucca.it, together with instructions for
their use.
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